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Article 10

THE IMP OF THE
PERVERSE
John Emil Vincent
Opacity and the Closet: Queer
Tactics in Foucault, Barthes, and
Warhol by Nicholas de Villiers.
Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2012. Pp. 224,
1 black-and-white photo. $75.00
cloth, $25.00 paper.

Nicholas de Villiers’s fine study
Opacity and the Closet shows signs
of what “ails” Queer studies. It also
just might offer some inkling of
a “cure.” Theoretically, however,
De Villiers does not set himself a
tall order; in fact, the explicit argument of the book is remarkably
limpid for a book on the opaque:
Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes,
and Andy Warhol all use varieties of performed opacity to stymie the confessional narrative
constitutive of the operations of
the closet. De Villiers offers careful readings of these deployments
as a riposte to remarkably bossy
posthumous biographical/critical
work. It is now nearly an industry:
Foucault, the theorist of the confessional, exposed! Barthes’s elegant
salvos on the slipperiness of language: repression plain and simple.
Warhol’s expansive vacuity read as
deeply psychological. Each subject
was, this chorus of voices insists,
too much a subject himself to sally
a radical critique of subjectivity.
De Villiers’s is a necessary
rescue mission, and expertly set
examples make it a meaty read. His
command of contemporary French
popular intellectual culture would
alone recommend his d
 iscussions of
Foucault and Barthes. Obviously,
the “
intellectual 
flavors” of
Foucault, Barthes, and Warhol
are quite different, but de Villiers
makes the case that they are
tacticians of high-gloss refusal.

The implicit argument of the book,
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which I discuss in this review, is that
identity politics, inimical to Queer
theory, is alive and remarkably well
at the heart of Queer studies. In a
perhaps all-too-familiar brand of
institutional irony, Queer theory,
one of several important critiques
of identity politics, bore Queer
studies, now a stronghold for the
same.
De Villiers’s preface features
Bartleby’s famous refusal, “I would
prefer not to,” suggesting that tactics of opacity complicate what
has become a rote “Foucauldian”
call-and-response. We ought not
attempt liberation; it is a ruse.
Confession, as a means to this fictive freedom, is a ruse. In the face
of the power smog monster, agency
itself: ruse! There are enough tired
rehearsals of this gory revenge
drama. Only someone invested
in not theorizing anymore would
insist that Foucault’s engine either
perform a perpetual motion miracle
or park itself in a station. Enter de
Villiers: what happens when you
acknowledge the epistemic force of
the closet but refuse showily to come
out of it or stay in it? What happens
when you perform not confessing
and not not confessing all at once?
The double negative, as with many
supercharged d
 oubly-negated performances, clearly doesn’t always
equal a positive. At the limit, for
example, being alive, being not
alive, and being undead macramé a curious arabesque out of
binary (digital: 1/0) yarn. One

part of Bartleby’s locution—when
yanked from its Melvillian socket
that seems m
 issing from Giorgio
Agamben’s praise for the scribe
who won’t scrib and from Gilles
Deleuze’s description of “I prefer
not to” as one of Bacon’s imploded
heads—is imperiousness. The
agent is still in charge of the action.
“I’m not particular,” the later-story
follow-up phrase, which often gets
lost in the shuffle, may be a more
powerful and involuted version of
willful opacity.
Perhaps, for reasons to follow, we might take up “not being
particular” rather than “preferring not to” as theorists. First of
all, it is an opacity that is at once
refusal and invitation, an opacity
with tonal range. It can be gracious, even stylish: Give me coffee or tea, I don’t mind. Or acid;
minding would be far too much
trouble. Opacity is interruption of
a form—the interview, the conversation, the autobiography, the theory—but it is not always strident.
The v ariety of examples de Villiers
teases out—Foucault’s explosive
laughter when he is introduced to
the idea of a cancer that kills only
homosexuals, Barthes’s more delicate p roposition of his “very queer
desire ‘to give imprecise answers to
precise questions: this imprecision
of the answer, even if it is perceived
as weakness, is an indirect way of
demystifying the question’” (87),
or Warhol’s spectacular mumbled
or parroted interviews—these are
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not really as much about preference per se as particularity and its
refusal. They are also, each in their
own way, beautiful, impish even,
in their fit to occasion. The forthright hitch of first person to not
being first person. An estimation
of oneself not forceful in any way,
possibly passive, not preferring,
simply denouncing the agency
to announce anything. The not
undenounced. The specifically not
unspecific. Often less limp handshake than the performance of a
gesture you know will interest or
please your interlocutor. The ectoplasmic? Camp?
Obviously this butts heads
with identity politics. But, you
ask, didn’t we have this discussion about the nonflush nature of
identity and identification? Wasn’t
this in fact one of the lodestones of
queer theory: Queering identity?
De Villiers is graceful and respectful, even if you can hear the creak
of his finger joints making bunny
ears: “I must . . . address this issue
of identity politics. I focus on three
white gay men as case studies and
forecast the critique that their positions (as prominent, ‘famous’ figures with creative agency) owe a
great deal to ‘white male privilege’”
(9). He rightly acknowledges that
white male privilege exists and
likely has a whole lot to do with
the matter at hand. However, he
abjures the proleptic, in a spritely,
impish even, start to the paragraph
following, the break as a kind of
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intake of fresh air: “I also do not
want to be too quick to decide that
the figures I am treating are matter-of-factly ‘male’ or ‘masculine’ in
their identifications” (9). We simply
can’t know in advance what a study
of three fascinating, creative, white,
gay male subjects will cast helpful
light on, until we actually do the
study. And emphasizing an important opacity himself, the opacity of
his crystal ball, de Villiers allows
himself the space to set out on his
inquiry. In a sense, his project must
remain more archival and curatorial than theoretical because of this
limitation. He is, as his subjects do,
showily showing what he will not
show. The curatorial being both
the stylistic and theoretical mode
and, as practiced, offering not just
exhibits, but Exhibits, in the unongoing discussion and inevitable
adjudication of the place of identity
politics in Queer studies.
I’m unclear why a “studies” so
interested in the vast variety of the
operation and experience of categorization isn’t just a tad troubled by
putting limits on that variety—particularly as it bears on the contours
of the field itself. I’m not harkening back to those super stupid, but
strangely effective, anti-PC rants of
Dinesh D’Souza, Camille Paglia, &
co. However, I’m not sure how privilege comes to all white, gay males
in a kind of kicking the vending
machine way. It in fact seems that
Queer “studies” presently is simply
recapitulation and without much of
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a difference from the early, certainly
important but not won nor lost, but
perhaps to tweak Butler’s fantastic four of melancholy: never won
never lost, “canon wars.” Where do
we go, and with what, from here?
Queer theory performed seems to
offer some hope.
Queer theory, pretty early on,
accepted that like a new, improved
Soylent Green, theory is made of
people. It is what makes a thrilling
theory and gives it its flavor (along
often with bespoke style). It is that
toggle between the insanely obvious and the genius, between the
perfectly grounded and the dizzyingly abstract. Is that the difference
between the microscope-wielding
studier and swirly-eyed theorist?
“People are different,” for example, Axiom 1 of Eve Sedgwick’s
Epistemology of the Closet (1990),
serves as a touchpoint for me. But,
then, I am not the standard of all
people nor all theoretical interests. This: being included in Eve’s
axiom. The history and present
of “gay liberation,” “queer lives,”
“globalization,” “trans identification,” “radical academics,” and so
on, are all made of people even if we
can have an argument about how
people are made. We need new
ways to hear people, new styles that
tickle or pinch; one thing we don’t
need to make a business of is shutting people up or down. “Queer
studies,” such as it is, is made of
people. (Note: I’m not humming
“Small World After All” under

my breath to myself right now
for nothing, however, while also
picturing a scene in which I gesticulate wildly, my twisted mouth
spitting out “Can’t we all just get
along!”) The speaker might be
assembled, dispersed, barely articulate, constructed, disarticulated,
however you want to say it, but the
speaker who shuts down, who prefers not to see the tension between
speaker’s privilege and what I will
call the proleptic fallacy, does so at
the peril of tugging theory from
its umbilicus: shared curiosity.
Here, I think of Fredric Jameson’s
“first hominid philosophers” arguing that there was not and there
would never be instrumentality. To
know best, much like Foucault’s
own too-obviously power-wielding
sovereign, but at the level of the
rhetorical, simply isn’t that interesting, nor convincing, it turns out.
As soon as John Ashbery’s faux
sigh “You can’t say it that way any
more” turns to a hiss in the mouth
of a queer studier, you know the
party is over.
In 1995, Lauren Berlant and
Michael Warner made the case
very convincingly that
AIDS activism forced the
issue of translating queerness
into the national scene. AIDS
made those of us who confronted it realize the deadly
stakes of discourse; it made us
realize the public and private
unvoiceability of so much that
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mattered, about anger, mourning, and desire; it made us
realize that d
 ifferent frames of
reference—science, news, religion, ordinary h
 omophobia—
compete and that their disjunction is lethal. . . . AIDS
also showed that rhetorics
of expertise limit the circulation of knowledge, ultimately
authorizing the technocratic
administration of peoples’
lives.1
Historically, AIDS is not the only
impetus to Queer theoretical discourse, but it is undeniably one very
important one. Maybe Feminism
invented the tricycle and the AIDS
crisis gave it a push. . . . However
it happened, and clearly that ought
be an o ngoing debate, the cocktail
did not turn the crisis into a cocktail party. Nor did the adjective
Queer keep Queer studies from
becoming a “rhetoric of expertise.”
Now it seems the challenge
to Queer studies, if it is to remain
dynamic, is to acknowledge its own
history. Such an activity (see: Other
Fields of Inquiry) is never simple.
Thus might we gain grounds upon
which to agree to disagree at least.
More and more we read of reinvigorating bad or historical feelings,
about feeling optimistic, utopic,
backward, futureless, about feeling
like or reading like an outsider or
an insider—many bright lights are
shining on and into our affective,
historical, and aesthetic terrain.
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Why is Queer studies, as it is held
(largely) within academic institutions, booklists, lecture series, and
intellectual communities, holding
this exciting work apart in a totally
awkward way such that one must
shake one’s head and say, “Not
much going on,” when, in fact, the
foregoing list merely gestures at
a bevy of thrilling things that are
going on in the field? Why doesn’t
this feel “shared”?
Style perhaps. Any bilious utterance of “you can’t say it that way
anymore” is using one of our dearest tools as a weapon against others against whom it works only to
the extent that they hold the tool
dear. Yes, theory is delicate; it is a
shared language. Therein its headrush. If shrill voices are deciding
rather than suggesting what we
talk with one another about, even
before we start talking about it,
our talk is doomed to feel, well,
bad. Cue the panopticon internalization of authority Gregorian
chant. The fundamental readerly
cooperation in any writerly project is what Queer theory needs to
champion within Queer studies.
In part, I believe this comes down
to the house where Queer studies, and to a certain extent Queer
theory, is living now. Universities
have become another sector of the
service industry, and undergraduate tastes are running the show on
what kind of work gets widely disseminated. Within reason, this is
fine. But when my undergraduates,
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as they in large numbers have, like
good identity politicians, choose the
easy vitriol of Judith Halberstam
over the stunning stylistic complexity of Eve Sedgwick (from whom
most of Halberstam’s spare central
axioms are trawled), and the field
seems to agree with their “that’s more
like me” assessment, I know something signal is missing the field. Is
that something a sense of our history? Why do I feel squeamish, just
now, with having written “our history”? And now with having written “written ‘our history’”? If, as
a participant in the field of Queer
studies, the move toward the first
person plural in statements about
Queer studies as a field of inquiry is,
starkly, either the rank appropriation by my gay, white male privilege or the empty placation by my
gay, white male privilege, don’t we
have ourselves a double bind?
But back to the task at hand.
Perhaps I think too much about
the footnote (pace Anthony Grafton). Especially when there are 51
pages of footnotes in a 218-page
book. And all of the footnotes are
at the back of the book, and they
are salad-style tossed—the deeply
discursive, the pleasantly personal,
the bow-and-kiss-ground, the
tersely citational. In this design
choice—likely not the author’s—
there is no quarter given the now
old-fashioned practice of citation
mining enabled by not quite Brazilian waxed but certainly slightly
less bearlike streamlined end-note

commentary balanced by internal
citations and works cited. At times
I felt as if I were thrown out of the
text as much, in fact, considering
that the footnotes are several points
smaller than the text, as being
coaxed into early blindness. Beside
which the constant flipping made
me feel at once like a distracted
slacker and a little like a “real stickler.” The belletristic strokes of the
prose churn too often into notational thrashing. I wish the press
would reconsider this design.
However, footnotes and all,
de Villiers delivers a clear case
against clarity’s clearness. To take
complicated theories and cook them
down to biography, he maintains,
is not complementary to cooking
them up. Foucault, Barthes, and
Warhol all have legacies worth surviving their legacies. This is a book
to tarry with; it is a knot of questions
elegant in its difficulty. We can play
with it, even if we can’t ever untie it.
John Emil Vincent, who lives in Montreal,
is author of Queer Lyrics: Difficulty and
Closure in American Poetry (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002) and John Ashbery
and You: His Later Books (University of
Georgia, 2007). He recently edited a collection of criticism about Jack Spicer (Wesleyan
University Press). His first book of poems,
Excitement Tax, will be published by DC
Books in fall 2017.
NOTE
1. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner,
“What Does Queer Theory Teach Us
about X?” PMLA 110, no. 3 (1995):
343–49, quotation on 345.

